Cash advance shop of Wisconsin v. City of Madison, 333 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2004)

Cash advance shop of Wisconsin v. City of Madison, 333 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2004)

This is certainly a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff The cash advance shop of Wisconsin contends that defendant City of Madison has enacted an ordinance that violates plaintiff’s legal rights to equal security and due procedure and it is unconstitutionally obscure. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation.

Whenever plaintiff filed its complaint, it desired an initial injunction to avoid defendant from enforcing the presumably unconstitutional ordinance.

Defendant reacted to your movement and presented a movement for summary judgment at the exact same time, asserting that the appropriate concepts determining the motions had been the exact same. Defendant asked that its movement for summary judgment be addressed without enabling plaintiff time for development, arguing that any development will be unneeded. we agreed that breakthrough wouldn’t normally help plaintiff (because legislative choices are “not at the mercy of courtroom factfinding and could be according to logical conjecture unsupported by proof or empirical data,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)), and offered its counsel a chance to advise the court whether he desired the opportunity for extra briefing; he penned towards the court on August 12, 2004, to express that extra briefing wouldn’t be necessary and therefore the court should go to determine the movement.

I conclude that defendant’s movement for summary judgment must certanly be issued because plaintiff cannot show that defendant lacked any basis that is rational legislating the nighttime closing of pay day loan shops. Continue Reading